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USSR: Disclaimers on Cuba Several Soviet spokesmen have denied Western charaes that the USSR has threatened to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. President Brezhnev, in his speech on 16 March to the Trade Union Congress, stated that the USSR would put the US in an "analogous position" if the US puts new missiles in Western Europe capable of striking Soviet territory. This remark has been widely interpreted as a threat to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. An earlier statement by a member of the Central Committee hinted at such a threat. On 21 March, however, the head of the USSR's Insti- tute of the USA and Canada told a British interviewer that there is no basis for Western speculation that the Soviets intend to violate the Kennedy-Khrushchev under- standing on Cuba. He declined to specify what Brezhnev meant by "analogous position" and urged the US to use diplomatic channels to determine this. General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff stated on 27 March in a TV interview in Moscow that the USSR can retaliate against US INF deployments without involv- ing "other territories." A leading Soviet foreign policy specialist subsequently told US Embassy officials in Moscow that Chervov's statement is authoritative. Comment: In raising the specter of a new Cuban missile crisis, Moscow may have intended that many in the West would come to view the planned deployment of US missiles in Western Europe as being as threatening to peace as Khrushchev's gamble in Cuba. The Soviets still want to make the Cuban analogy and continue to speak of the USSR's right and intention to retaliate if the US proceeds with its INF plans. Moscow, however, is aware of the danger of overplay- ing the Cuban card. By denying that they have threatened to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, the Soviets are trying to avoid clamor over Cuba that would distract attention from their campaign against US missile deployment plans.	anitized Copy Approved for Releas	e 2011/02/18 : CIA-RDP8	34T00301R000200010121-1	
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ISRAEL: Druze Unrest on the Golan Heights	5
Defense Minister Sharon met yesterday of the Druze community on the Golan Height eral Druze were injured in a clash with Is The Druze were protesting attempts to forchange Israeli military government identitiones issued by the Interior Ministry. Most 14,000-member Druze community have refused because they believe that they imply acceptaw passed by the Knesset late last year a Golan. A general strike to protest the an	ts after sev- sraeli soldiers. te them to ex- ty cards for st of the nearly the new cards otance of the annexing the
in February, and Israel responded by seali	ng off the
major Druze villages.	25X1
Comment: The Begin government is out Druze to accept the cards as part of its eplement the annexation. Recent unrest amorgaza, and Israeli Arabs probably has only the government's determination to move ahe	efforts to im- ong West Bank, reinforced
implement the law.	25
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: Gromyko's Visit	
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Foreign Minister Gromyko begins a vistomorrow.	sit to Yugoslavia 25X1
Comment: Both sides seek to preserve of symmetry in Yugoslavia's relations with USSR, and Gromyko's trip is a sequel to Se Haig's visit last September. Although the Soviets disagree on Poland, Afghanistan and	the US and the ecretary of State Yugoslavs and
national issues, they have avoided open pomonths. Gromyko probably will push for la	lemics in recent nguage in the
communique that will appear to align Belgr on disarmament issues, but the Yugoslavs w blanket endorsement of the Soviet position likely to discuss the level of Soviet atte	vill resist any He also is endance at the
Yugoslav party congress in June, where the may air their differences more openly.	two countries 25X1

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INTERNATIONAL: G-77 Proposal on Global Negotiations
The Group of 77, the Third World caucus at the UN, has endorsed a draft resolution for launching Global Negotiations on international economic cooperation. The draft leaves for future consideration the pivotal question of whether Global Negotiations will permit the General Assembly to direct the work of such UN specialized agencies as the IMF and the World Bank.
Comment: West European countries and Japan probably will support the resolution. OPEC members of the G-77 fear isolation on energy issues in Global Negotiations and hope that the US will reject the proposal by maintaining the demand for continued autonomy for the international monetary institutions.

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